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Editorial 
 
 
 
The Thousand Cataluñas of Europe 
 
Irrespective of the perspective from which one looks at the Catalonian events, which are 
still unfolding under our incredulous eyes, the impression can only be univocal: Spain is 
right and Catalonia is wrong. The claim of the Spanish Government to preserve the uni-
ty of the nation is well founded; conversely, the independence proclaimed by the Cata-
lonian Government amounts to an extra ordinem revolutionary act. 
This is the conclusion that must be naturally drawn from an inquiry conducted on 
the basis of Spanish Constitutional law. While recognising “the right to self-government 
of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them 
all”, Section 2 of the Spanish Constitution points out that “[t]he Constitution is based on 
the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of 
all Spaniards”. 
This would inevitably also be the conclusion to be drawn from an international law 
perspective. The prevailing scholarly view, and the international case law, regard seces-
sion as the outcome of a factual process that takes place in an area largely unregulated 
by the law and, therefore, is neither permitted nor prohibited by international law 
(along these lines, see International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, advisory opinion of 
22 July 2010, paras 79-84). Only indirectly do international rules govern that process, 
imposing on the parties to the conflict the obligation to comply with fundamental inter-
ests of the international community, such as the prohibition of excessive use of force 
and the obligation to comply with the rules protecting human rights. Moreover, the sit-
uation in Catalonia does not seem to come within the scope of the principle of self-
determination, that applies to a minority group only if it is excluded from the govern-
mental functions of a territory on grounds of race, creed or colour, according to the fa-
mous Declaration of the UN General Assembly on the Friendly Relations among States 
of 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625.  
The same answer unequivocally flows from a legal inquiry conducted on the basis 
of European law. Also from that perspective, it is difficult to identify legal rules or prin-
ciples conferring to sub-state entities a right to secede from their home country. Quite 
the contrary, from its inception, the EU legal order is based on the international concep-
tion of its Member States as unitary actors, represented by their Governments. States, 
and only States, can become members of the Union or withdraw from it. And States are 
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the only politically organised communities that can convey, albeit indirectly, democratic 
legitimacy to the Union, under Art. 10 TEU. 
It is in this conceptual environment that the Commission has elaborated its conception of 
a secession from a Member State as a process entailing the exclusion of the seceding ter-
ritory from the EU. This conception has been probably developed with a view to discour-
aging secessionist movements. In case of a unilateral secession, if the newly born State 
applied to the EU, it would probably meet the fierce opposition of its former home coun-
try, which would presumably veto its application. In the light of the dim perspective of an 
independence outside the EU, where the small newly born State would be left alone to 
navigate the troubled waters of the globalisation, many claims would probably vanish. 
From a legal viewpoint, however, this conception is not as obvious as presented. It 
is based on the classical principle of the clean slate, according to which a newly born 
State has not obligations deriving from treaties concluded by its predecessor in the 
government of the same territory. However, the international practice is much less uni-
vocal than this facile formula may indicate. The classical rule of the clean slate, designed 
to secure the absolute freedom of action of the newcomer in the club of the sovereign 
entities, has been developed in a very simple legal world, hinged around a conception 
of international obligations as an exception to the absoluteness of the sovereignty ex-
erted by a State on a given territory. It is less adequate to the needs of contemporary 
international law, where States are under a plethora of international obligations de-
signed to fulfil a variety of different values and interests, individual, collective or even 
universal. Correspondingly, the international practice of States succession in regard to 
treaties appears to be much more nuanced and variegated than the Commission seems 
to believe. More and more, international law tends to favour the continuity of the legal 
regime applicable to a given territory that has acquired statehood, in particular with re-
gard to treaties that confer a certain territorial status or grant rights and duties to indi-
viduals settled therein, or with regard to legal regimes whose enduring application cor-
responds to a collective interest of the international community. 
Arguably, to deal with the troubled issue of the secession of a part of the territory from 
a EU Member State, the continuity model may be more appropriate than the clean slate 
model. Not only would it ensure the uninterrupted possession of the rights conferred by 
EU law to individuals, who, at least from Van Gend den Loos on (Court of Justice, judgment 
of 5 February 1963, case 26/62), are, indisputably, subject of this composite “new legal or-
der of international law” (ibid., p. 12). It could also serve the collective interest not to have 
the Union suddenly amputated of part of its territory and of its citizenship. Thus, if a choice 
ought to be made between the two models, that of the clean slate and that of the continui-
ty in the rights and obligations flowing from a treaty, the latter would seem more con-
sistent with the overall objective of integration that is the raison d’être of the EU. 
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This is, indeed, the position advocated, with great persuasive force, by Kochenov and 
van den Brink in a seminal work published in the very first issue of European Papers (Se-
cessions from EU Member States: The Imperative of Union’s Neutrality, in Vol. 1, 2016, No 
1, p. 67 et seq.). In their view, the neutrality of the EU vis-à-vis a secession in one of its 
Member States should entail, if conducted on the basis of a democratic method, the au-
tomatic membership to the EU of the new State, and the consequential need to amend, to 
the extent necessary, the founding treaties. In Kochenov and van den Brink’s view, this 
conclusion is the most consistent with the ethos of the Union, “the tamer of States and 
the promotor of liberal, inclusive and tolerant nationhood” (ibid., p. 85).  
This felicitous definition encapsulates in a few words the entire political philosophy 
that underlies the process of integration. The establishment of a European Union was 
regarded precisely as the antidote to the “absolute sovereignty of the national States” 
by the Ventotene Manifesto. This text, written between 1941 and 1942, well describes 
the feverish intellectual reflection that ultimately gave birth to the idea of a federation 
among the European peoples, designed to cure “[t]he multiple problems which poison 
international life on the continent [that] have proved to be insoluble: tracing boundaries 
through areas inhabited by mixed populations, defence of alien minorities, seaports for 
landlocked countries, the Balkan Question, the Irish problem, and so on”. 
There is, however, a case to be made for escaping the paralysing alternative between 
contradictory claims of sovereignty. If the historical mission of Europe is to assuage the 
“absolute sovereignty ideologies”, to borrow again an expression used by Kochenov and 
van den Brink (ibid.), this entails moving away from two opposing versions of national-
ism: the one inherent in the claim to the unity of the Member States – many of which 
still encompass ethnic, national or religious minorities – as well as the one inherent in 
the claim for statehood of these minorities. The latter is not less poisonous than the 
former, as it entails the acquisition, by a territorial community, of the stigmas of sover-
eignty against which it had hitherto strenuously fought. The conception of the European 
Union as an antidote to a poisonous bite, hence, must work both ways: against the bit-
ten and against the biter. 
But how can the EU help solve what appears to be an unsolvable conundrum? The 
EU is not a panacea and its invocation is certainly not a ready-made recipe for whatever 
difficulty may arise. However, a line of conceptual research based on its historical mis-
sion could point to a direction along which both antithetical claims could be assuaged. 
One of the idiosyncratic features of the political system of the EU is its reliance on 
the international system of representation according to which the Member States are 
represented by their executives. Yet, precisely this model can represent a powerful in-
centive to claim independence and, conversely, to resist it. By claiming independence, 
sub-State communities are driven by the luring idea of having a seat in the European 
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“control room”; conversely, by resisting it, Member States reaffirm the idea that that 
room is reserved to the current members of that exclusive club.  
In other words, in European as well as in international law, statehood is a threshold 
notion (all-or-nothing). If this personification of the State as a unitary entity is compre-
hensible under international law, it is less comprehensible at the European level, name-
ly in a Constitutional legal order whose ultimate objective is to attain a high degree of 
integration among the peoples of Europe. 
The question thus arises as to whether in European law this monolithic representa-
tion of statehood can be attenuated in favour of institutional solutions that reflect more 
faithfully the pluralistic nature of the modern forms of State.  
It is certainly not the aim of the present writing to indicate the lines of a possible reform 
of the Constitutional setting of the Union; the more so at a time in which the pace of 
history seems rather to point to the opposite direction; to celebrate the triumph of the 
Member States as the main stakeholders of the European club. But it is precisely at this 
time that scholars have the moral duty to present the shortcomings of this historical 
tendency and the benefits of taking a different direction.  
In particular, a transformation of the composition of the Council into a permanent 
body, including not only representatives of the Governments of the Member States, but 
also of their National Parliaments and, where present, also of their sub-national com-
munities, may considerably defuse the tendency to independentism that is still present 
around Europe.  
The adoption of a pluralistic representation of States within the EU may have other 
substantial benefits. It would help express the wider range of interests of the Member 
States and not only those of their executives; it would loosen the grip of national politi-
cal pressures and facilitate the emergence of a general interest of the Union. It would 
attenuate the intergovernmentalism inherent in what has been labelled as la méthode 
de l’Union, that constitutes the mortal sin of the process of the European integration. 
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